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Abstract: In this paper we present a novel approach for 
securing financial XML transactions using an effective and 
intelligent fuzzy classification technique. Our approach defines 
the process of classifying XML content using a set of fuzzy 
variables. upon fuzzy classification phase, a unique value is 
assigned to a defined attribute named "ImportanceLevel". 
Assigned value indicates the data sensitivity for each XML tag. 
The framework also defines the process of securing classified 
financial XML message content by performing element-wise 
XML encryption on selected parts defined in fuzzy classification 
phase. Element-wise encryption is performed using symmetric 
encryption using AES algorithm with different key sizes. Key size 
of 128-bit is being used on tags classified with "Medium" 
importance level; a key size of 256-bit is being used on tags 
classified with "High" importance level.     
An implementation has been performed on a real-life 
environment using online banking system in one of the leading 
banks in Jordan to demonstrate its flexibility, feasibility, and 
efficiency. Our experimental results of the new model verified 
tangible enhancements in encryption efficiency, processing-time 
reduction, and resulting XML message sizes. 
 
Index Terms –XML Encryption, Fuzzy XML, Fuzzy 
Classification, XML Security, Banking Security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [1] has been widely 
adopted in many financial institutions in their daily 
transactions; this adoption was due to the flexible nature of 
XML providing a common syntax for systems messaging in 
general and in financial messaging in specific [2]. Excessive 
use of XML in financial transactions messaging created an 
aligned interest in security protocols integrated into XML 
solutions in order to protect exchanged XML messages in an 
efficient yet powerful mechanism. There are several 
approaches proposed by researchers to secure XML messages.  
Many models have been proposed to protect exchanged 
messages both on the network level [10, 11] and on the XML 
level. Among the proposed models, W3C played a major role, 
providing standardized forms to represent XML data in a 
secure and trusted method. W3C introduced XML Encryption 
[3], XML Signature [4], and XML Key Management [5].  
The XML Encryption standard defines how to encrypt the 
XML message. This can involve fully encrypting the entire 
message, partially encrypting it by selecting parts of each 
message, or even encrypting external elements attached to the 
message itself. Although this model is able to secure XML 
messages, some issues arose concerning performance and 
inefficient memory usage [12, 13], leaving room for more 
improvements and enhancements.  
 
 
However, financial institutions (i.e. banks) perform large 
volume of transactions on daily basis which require XML 
encryption on large scale. Encrypting large volume of 
messages in full will result performance and resource issues. 
Therefore, an approach is needed to encrypt specified portions 
of an XML document, syntax for representing encrypted parts, 
and processing rules for decrypting them. W3C XML 
encryption has the feature to encrypt parts of an XML 
document called element-wise encryption which is the process 
of encrypting parts of the XML document. To avoid any 
performance or resources issues, a mechanism should be 
considered to choose which parts of the XML document to be 
encrypted on the fly, whereby those parts are selected upon 
intelligent criteria detecting sensitive information within the 
XML document. 
Fuzzy Logic (FL) [18] approach can be used here to 
distinguish sensitive parts within each XML document. FL 
provides a simple way to arrive at a definite conclusion based 
upon vague, ambiguous, imprecise, noisy, or missing input 
information. FL's approach to control problems mimics how a 
person would make faster decision. FL incorporates a simple, 
rule-based ‘IF X AND Y THEN Z’ approach to a solving 
control problem rather than attempting to model a system 
mathematically. The FL model is empirically-based, relying on 
an operator's experience rather than their technical 
understanding of the system.  
Fuzzy logic approach is quantified based on a combination 
of historical data and expert input. Fuzzy logic has been used 
for decades in the computer sciences to embed expert input 
into computer models for a broad range of applications. The 
advantage of the fuzzy approach is that it enables processing 
of vaguely defined variables, and variables whose relationships 
cannot be defined by mathematical relationships. Fuzzy logic 
can incorporate expert human judgment to define those 
variables and their relationships. The model can be closer to 
reality and be more site specific than some of the other 
methods [19]. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Flexibility, expressiveness, and usability of XML have 
formed a motive for researchers to shed more light on XML 
security. Researchers have focused their interests on securing 
XML data due to the increased usage of XML in many 
business and educational cases. Efficient models have been 
proposed [3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11] to add a secure layer over 
exchanged XML data. The models’ main purpose is to ensure 
data confidentiality and authenticity. Many XML threats [12] 
have been considered, such as Oversized Payload, Schema 
Change, XML Routing, and Recursive Payload. Such threats 
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have forced researchers to pay more attention to securing 
exchanged XML messages. 
W3C XML Encryption Working Group [3] is developing a 
method for XML encryption and decryption. The group used 
XML syntax to represent the secured elements in XML. Their 
approach is able to encrypt the whole message, full nodes, and 
sub-trees; however, it is not able to encrypt an element while 
keeping the descendants of the same node unchanged, and also 
it cannot handle attribute encryption. Therefore, a solution has 
been proposed [13] to handle this limitation. Ed Simon 
proposed changing the attribute so that it is encrypted with the 
EncryptedDataManifest attribute and including any other 
details inside the element. Another solution proposed was to 
use XSLT for attribute transformation into elements to 
perform the encryption process. However, this suggested 
solution did not face success, as the decrypted parts need to be 
transformed back to the original attributes for message 
validation against the corresponding XML schema.  
A system has been proposed by [15] for pool encryption, 
which has the capability of removing sensitive information 
from the output file. Their basic idea is to parse the XML 
message which needs encryption into a DOM tree, where each 
node in the tree is labeled and all information related to its 
position is attached to the corresponding node. Then each node 
is encrypted individually with a "node specific" encryption 
key. These nodes are removed from their original position in 
the XML message into a pool which contains all other 
encrypted nodes. The pool can be saved into the original 
message or in a different message. The sender determines the 
decryption capabilities of different users by distributing the 
collection of node keys to the receiver. This collection of node 
keys is encrypted with the recipients’ key before final 
submission. Although this model solves the issue of removing 
confidential material from the main message and hides the size 
of the encrypted content, it has the following disadvantages:  
The original position for each individual node needs to be 
attached, Due to the addition of "the position information", a 
decent increase in message size is noticed, Due to the pool of 
node keys, a decent increase in message size is noticed, and 
High resource usage and bandwidth allocation, more storage 
more processing power is needed, and A unique node key has 
to be generated for each node. 
[20] Introduced an XML access control (XAC) that is a 
server-side access control and a trusted access control 
processor allowing security policies and procedures to be 
established based on the policies, XAC present a way to 
control access of users to specific portions of the full XML 
document that is stored on a server.  XAC encrypts an XML 
element with the ability to exclude its descendants. This 
specific feature gives the advantage of XAC over XEnc 
because XEnc requires the encryption of a full sub-tree.  
[21] Presented an approach to incorporate fuzziness in 
XML. Their approach tried to identify the potential entities in 
XML that can have fuzzy values. They analyze the structure of 
an XML document to identify the portions that can be handled 
using fuzziness; then they specify the appropriate mechanism 
to incorporate fuzziness.  Their approach focused on XML 
being structured (logical and physical) and well-formed 
language. 
[22] Introduced a fuzzy XML data model to manage fuzzy 
data in XML, based on possibility distribution theory, by first 
identified multiple granularity of data fuzziness in UML and 
XML. The fuzzy UML data model and fuzzy XML data model 
that address all types of fuzziness are developed. Further, they 
developed the formal conversions from the fuzzy UML model 
to the fuzzy XML model, and the formal mapping from the 
fuzzy XML model to the fuzzy relational databases. 
[23] Presented an XML methodology to represent fuzzy 
systems for facilitating collaborations in fuzzy applications 
and design. DTD and XML Schema are proposed to define 
fuzzy systems in general. One fuzzy system can be represented 
in different formats understood by different applications using 
the concept of XSLT stylesheets. With an example, they 
represent that given fuzzy system in XML and transform it to 
comprehensible formats for Matlab and FuzzyJess 
applications. 
[24] Proposed an approach along with an automated tool 
called (FXML2FOnto) for constructing fuzzy ontologies from 
fuzzy XML models, they also investigated how the 
constructive fuzzy ontologies may be useful for improving 
some of the fuzzy XML applications (i.e. reasoning on fuzzy 
XML models). 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN 
The model consists of two major parts. Each part has a 
discrete scope acting as an independent unit and forming an 
essential part of the whole system. Content is classified using a 
set of fuzzy classification techniques [8] and encrypted using 
an element-wise encryption on selected parts within each XML 
message. The fuzzification phase is performed before the 
XML messages are submitted to the next phase which is 
responsible for securing message content. The process of fuzzy 
classification is mainly responsible for defining an attribute 
value and assigning it to an existing XML tag named 
"ImportanceLevel". The assigned value will be used to define 
the security level needed in the next phase. Next phase 
involves applying element-wise encryption to different parts 
within each XML message. Encryption could be for the whole 
message or elements of an XML message. The “Importance 
Level” value assigned in fuzzification phase is also used to 
decide which type of encryption and key size is to be 
deployed. Element-wise encryption is based on W3C’s 
recommendation [3]. 
 
Figure 1.0 illustrates the system model and basic components 
used to form our framework. As seen in the figure, the main 
two components are displayed as two separate units each act as 
an independent unit performing set of operations that used as 
input to the other phase. 
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Figure 1: Main System Design 
 
The system core has been built based on two major phases. 
Phase one involves performing a set of fuzzy classification 
techniques on XML messages. The fuzzy classification process 
is designed mainly for deciding the similarity of different 
standards within the same message. Basically the main target is 
to describe how semantic concepts are evaluated and explained 
by the provided XML content. Upon fuzzy classification, a 
new value is generated and assigned to an existing XML tag. 
We assigned the name "ImportanceLevel" to the mentioned tag 
so we can use it as an identifier for the next phase. Phase two 
involves applying element-wise encryption to different parts 
within each XML message. Encryption could be for the whole 
message, some elements, or some attributes of an element of 
an XML message. The ImportanceLevel value assigned in 
phase one is used to decide which type of encryption is 
performed, and also decides which parts of the XML message 
are to be encrypted. We base our encryption on W3C’s 
recommendation [3]. The following stages form system life 
cycle in details: 
 
1. Fuzzy Classification Phase 
 
In our fuzzy classification phase, we categorized 10 
transaction characteristics into three different layers according 
to their type. The characteristics were chosen after exploring 
different experts’ opinions and backgrounds, reviewing 
financial analysis tools, reviewing technical reports, 
researching different online and offline financial systems 
conducted within the financial institution, and performing a set 
of internal surveys among banking group heads. We 
categorized these 10 transaction characteristics extracted from 
the XML message into three layers (Account Segment, Details 
Segment, and Environment Segment).  Grouping will facilitate 
and simplify the process of fuzzy classification. The 
architecture of the fuzzy logic inference-based classification 
model is shown in Figure 2. 
This phase is responsible for assigning a new value which is 
the importance level for each XML tag. The main idea is 
distinguish which parts of the message is to be encrypted using 
AES-128 bit key encryption and which are to be encrypted 
using AES-256 bit key. Usage of the key depends on the 
importance level value (high, medium or low), whereby we 
deploy the 128-bit key on tags with "Medium" Importance 
Level and the 256-bit key on tags with "High" Importance 
Level value. Tags with a "Low" importance level value are 
forwarded directly to the message assembler where no 
encryption is performed. The phase uses fuzzification 
techniques of a set of input variables based on ten 10 
characteristics extracted from the XML message, all 
depending on the previous knowledge experience and 
expertise backgrounds. The 10 characteristics are defined in 
details as follows: 
1) Transaction Amount: Financial institutions set pre-defined 
transaction limits. The limits allow users to perform 
transactions with specified limits on a daily basis. The range of 
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transaction limits is defined based on the local policy within 
each institution. Banks normally treat the transaction amount 
as an alert to any critical transaction, the amount is used in 
most banks to measure the weight of total transaction 
performed. Source, destination, and amount all combined to 
act as an alert which is already pre-defined based on bank's 
policy. Large transaction amounts will affect the importance of 
the transaction itself, which can be used in our model as a 
measurement item in our importance level evaluation. 
2) Transaction Currency: A well-defined list of allowed 
currencies that can be used online or offline. Each currency 
has its own set of risk variables depending on usage and 
importance. Foreign currency uses exchange rates, operational 
interference, and market value for the transaction the moment 
occurred. Banks treat each FX transaction with high 
importance, because it involves buying and selling with bank's 
rate. We have used this factor in our importance evaluation 
3) Account Type: Accounts are segmented within each 
institution. Segmentation is performed to enable application of 
a set of internal rules on selected segments. Each segment has 
its own value and weight, for example corporate account 
segments are listed with high importance and priority because 
most of the transactions are with large volume which can 
benefit the bank for each transaction. We used this factor due 
to its role deciding the importance level for the whole 
transaction. 
4) Transaction Notes: Exceptions are placed upon unusual 
activity on a specific account, and such exceptions will raise a 
flag in any transaction being processed to handle the exception 
before the process is completed. Having a flagged transaction 
will raise the importance level and trigger an alert to monitor 
that specific transaction due to its importance; we have used 
this factor to measure the importance level in term of 
transaction critical weight. 
5) Profile ID: A unique identifier for the destination account 
owner, the value is set during the system integration and 
profile creation process. companies or individuals with custom 
profile ID's have a high potential to be monitored for 
transactions, monitoring is based on the transaction amount 
after classifying each profile id whereby a range of ID's are 
listed in the high importance zone, all after deploying bank's 
methods and procedures. 
6) Account Tries: How many times the account is used in the 
system; more usage means more trust whereby the history of 
the account is known and trusted. A historical log is kept and 
evaluated on regular basis to confirm trusted accounts and 
suspicious ones. Evaluation will result a set of important 
ranges of trusted accounts to be used in transaction evaluation 
and setting importance level 
7) Incorrect Password Tries: The number of times users try to 
enter the password incorrectly to complete the financial 
transaction. This factor adds a slight importance level for each 
transaction, high rate of incorrect tries gives an indication of 
high importance. 
8) Time Spent on the Service: The time spent navigating the 
service before performing the transaction. The time range is 
set based on the bank’s policy, taking into consideration peak 
hours. This factor considered a technical factors to measure 
importance level of the transaction which is based on non-
financial elements 
9) Daily Transactions: How many transactions are performed 
before the financial transaction is carried out. Number of daily 
transactions put a weight on overall importance level for the 
transaction itself, whereby number of transactions to be 
performed is set based on bank's policy within the allowed 
ranges. 
10) Transaction Time: The financial day is categorized in 
three periods: peak period, normal hours, and dead zone. 
Periods are defined separately by the financial institution 
based on local policy and the historical transactions range. 
Each period has its own value which adds an importance level 
and how the occurrence of any transaction is affected by the 
time of occurrence. Ranges are set to weigh an importance 
level when the transaction is performed. 
 
2. Fuzzy Methodology 
 
Our fuzzy classification phase is based on Mamdani [8] 
fuzzy inference, performing the basic four steps shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Mamdani fuzzy inference system 
 
Step 1 (Fuzzification): Take the crisp input X and Input Y and 
determine the degree to which these inputs belong to, and 
where they fit into, the fuzzy set. Figure 3 illustrates an 
example of a linguistic variable used representing one factor, 
which is the transaction currency. The x-axis represents the 
range of transaction amount. The y-axis represents the degree 
of each value in the linguistic descriptor. 
 
Transaction Currency (Non-Sensitive, Normal, Sensitive) 
Variable used: Transaction Amount 
Ranges: 
  Non-Sensitive: [0, 0, 6, 8] 
   Normal: [6, 9, 12] 
   Sensitive: [10, 12, 18, 18] 
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Figure 3 Input variables in the fuzzification step 
 
Step 2 (Rule Evaluation): Take the fuzzy inputs and apply 
them to the qualified fuzzy rules. The fuzzy operators (AND / 
OR) are used in case of any uncertainty to get a single value. 
The outcome value is called “Truth Value” which will be 
applied to the membership function for rule evaluation. 
Step 3 (Aggregation of the Rule Outputs): Process of 
unification of the outputs of all the rules. Combining scaled 
rules into a single fuzzy set for each variable. 
Step 4 (Transforming the fuzzy output into a crisp output):  
Figure 4 illustrates an example of an expected crisp output 
[Low, Medium, and High] 
 
 
Figure 4 Sample output of classification rate “importance level” 
 
The output should have a clear crisp value where it will be 
assigned to each tag classified. 
Low: Means the importance level is low and more attention 
should not be paid to the value. The root element and child 
tags should be forwarded directly to the message assembler, 
skipping the encryption phase. 
Medium: The tag is important to some extent, and the tag 
attribute is assigned the value of medium so an element-wise 
encryption will be applied using the AES algorithm with a 
128-bit key on selected parts. 
High: To be handled with high importance and encrypted in 
the next phase using the AES algorithm with a 256-bit key. 
 
3. Detection Module 
 
To perform the fuzzy inference system we have categorized 
the XML tags within each message into 10 characteristics 
distributed into three layers, each with its own weight and 
criteria. The layers are Account Layer, Details Layer, and 
Environment Layer. Figure 5 represents the layers 
distribution.
 
Figure 5 Layers Distribution 
 
By giving a weight to each layer, the calculation of overall 
weight is based on the following criteria: 
Importance Level: Sum (Layer Weight * Layer Member) 
Rule Base: Each layer has a set of rules defined based on input 
variables within each layer. The rule is based on the “IF-
THEN” rule. The rule base should contain a number of entries 
depending on how many layer members exist. For example, 
layer 1 has three members and we have three outputs expected, 
so the entries should be calculated as (3ᵌ) = 27 entries 
presenting the rules for that layer.  
The final evaluation is dependent on finding the centre of 
gravity as shown in the following equation: 
 


=
dxx
dxxx
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i
i
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µ
µ
 
 
µi(x): Aggregated membership function.  
x: Output variable. 
After deploying the fuzzy classification methodology on the 
three layers, we then have a list of classified tags with an 
importance level attribute defined and assigned. 
 
4. Encryption Module 
 
The encryption phase has two possibilities: the first one is to 
perform an element-wise encryption using the AES algorithm 
with a key size of 256-bit, while the second is to perform an 
element-wise encryption using the AES algorithm with a key 
size of 128-bit. Key size is determined by the Importance 
Level value assigned in the fuzzy classification phase. Figure 6 
illustrates the process of encryption. Tags with "Low" 
ImportanceLevel will be forwarded directly to the message 
composition stage without any type of encryption being 
performed. 
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Figure 6 Encryption module layout 
 
Tags related to the parent tag are also encrypted using the 
same level of encryption. Child tags behaviour is taken from 
the parent "ImportanceLevel" value.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates the XML message after the fuzzy 
classification phase where the “ImportanceLevel” attribute is 
assigned a value. 
 
 
Figure 7 Sample XML message after fuzzy classification 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the same XML message after encryption 
depending on the fuzzy classification performed earlier. 
 
 
Figure 8 Sample XML message after encryption phase 
 
Tags related to the parent tag are also encrypted using the 
same level of encryption. Child tags behavior is taken from the 
parent "ImportanceLevel" value. In Figure 7 (Account Holder, 
Account Number, Amount, Currency, and Type), tags are 
encrypted using AES encryption with a key size of 256 bit as 
per their parent "Account" layer. Basically we inherit the 
encryption behavior from parent to child as per our 
categorization process, and the categorization process in our 
model is built based on relevance and parent tag evaluation. 
 
Keys used during the encryption process should be transferred 
to the decryptor in the destination using a secure and private 
method. We use Diffie-Hellman [16] key exchange for the 
handover of keys between source and destination. Figure 9 
illustrates how to exchange keys between source and 
destination. 
 
Figure 9 Key exchange using D-H method 
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS 
We have performed our evaluation using two sets of XML 
messages; each set represent a period in which the messages 
were extracted. Each set has number of XML messages to test. 
Collected XML messages present online banking service 
transactions fetched from Jordan Ahli Bank, one of the leading 
banks in Jordan. We have selected to deploy full and partial 
encryption on selected sets of XML messages, whereby we 
will deploy full encryption on first set of XML messages, and 
partial encryption on the second set of XML message. 
The two sets have been selected randomly taken for a period 
of seven months (between January 2012 until August 2012) 
representing financial transactions in specific. In the first set 
we collected 1,000 random XML messages presenting a period 
of three months (between January 2012 and March 2012). In 
the second set we used 1,500 XML messages presenting a 
period of four months taken (between April 2012 and August 
2012). Sample sets have been collected after taking necessary 
approvals and authorizations from the bank’s concerned 
departments. Table 1 illustrates the two sets of XML messages 
in details. 
TABLE 1: EXPERIMENT SET DETAILS 
Set Messages Nodes Size Period Encryption 
1 1,000 4,000 947 KB 
3 Months 
Jan 12-Mar12 Full 
2 1,500 6,000 1380 KB 
4 Months 
Apr12-Aug12 Partial 
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Figure 10 illustrate an actual XML message fetched form one 
of the XML messages in set 1. 
 
 
Figure 10 Actual XML message from Set 1 
 
Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 illustrate a sample of the data 
provided in set 1, segregated into three layers. 
 
TABLE 2: SAMPLE OF DATA RECEIVED CLASSIFIED FOR LAYER 1 
Transaction 
Amount 
Transaction 
Currency 
Account 
Type 
Account 
Segment 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Normal Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
 
TABLE 3: SAMPLE OF DATA RECEIVED CLASSIFIED FOR LAYER 2 
Transaction 
Notes CODE 
Destination 
ProfileID 
Destination  
Account 
Tries 
Incorrect 
 Password 
Tries 
Details 
Segment 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive 
Non-
Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive 
Non-
Sensitive 
Non-
Sensitive Medium 
Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive 
Non-
Sensitive Medium 
 
TABLE 4: SAMPLE OF DATA RECEIVED CLASSIFIED FOR LAYER 3 
Time On  
Site 
Daily 
Transactions 
Transaction  
Time 
Transaction 
Level  
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
 
To ensure we are evaluating our model in a fair and 
comprehensive manner, we divided our evaluation into two 
stages. Evaluation stages are compared against W3C XML 
Encryption Recommendations. In each stage there are two 
experiments performed, each experiment presents an 
encryption using different key sizes. In first stage we have 
deployed full message encryption using W3C encryption 
standard with different key sizes. In the second stage we have 
deployed partial encryption using W3C encryption standard 
with different key sizes.   
Results from both stages are compared against our model 
which uses element-wise encryption and mixture of key sizes. 
Table 5 illustrates the evaluation details for stage 1. 
 
TABLE 5: STAGE 1 SET DETAILS 
 
Stage 1: Evaluation for this stage has been conducted by 
performing two experiments; first experiment deployed by 
performing full encryption using W3C XML encryption 
standard with a 128-bit key size, deployed on the first set of 
1,000 XML messages. SXMS uses the same sample of XML 
messages to deploy element-wise encryption. SXMS model 
uses symmetric AES encryption with mixed key values (128-
bit, 256-bit), Key size used in the encryption process depends 
on the importance level attribute value assigned by the 
fuzzification stage for selected set of tags within each XML 
message. Our model main goal is to optimize and increase 
encryption-processing time; therefore we have listed the 
number of occurrences for “High” and “Medium”| importance 
level which require an encryption process to secure existing 
content. Table 6 represents the number of occurrences for 
transactions marked with “High” and “Medium” across the 
three layers.  
 
TABLE 6: APPEARANCES FOR EACH CLASSIFICATION LAYER 
 
Classification Layer 
“High”  
Appearances 
“Medium”  
Appearances 
Percentage 
(High + 
Medium) 
Layer1 (Account) 267 62 32.9% 
Layer 2 (Details) 401 410 81.1% 
Layer 3 (Environment) 250 421 67.1% 
 
As seen in table 6, the highest occurrences for “High” and 
“Medium” importance level combined is 32.9% in layer 1, 
which means only 32.9% of the 1,000 XML messages require 
an encryption processing either using 128bit key or 256bit key, 
leaving a 67.1% of the sample data to be forwarded directly to 
message assembler without the need of the encryption process. 
In brief, instead of performing full encryption for the whole 
XML message or even performing partial encryption on pre-
selected parts, we were able to produce secured, optimized, 
and utilized messages, performing encryption only on needed 
parts selected using our fuzzy classification techniques. 
Figure 11 present an actual XML message after fuzzy 
classification phase where we notice the importance level 
value assigned per root node in each XML message.  
Stage XML Messages Model 
Experiment 1 
Used Key 
Experiment 2 
Used Key 
1 
1,000 
Messages 
4,000 
Nodes 
W3C 
Full 
Encryption 
128 bit 256 bit 
SXMS 
Element-
Wise 
128 bit or 256 
bit or NO 
Encryption 
128 bit or 256 
bit or NO 
Encryption 
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Figure 11 Classified XML message taken from first implementation 
 
Table 7 illustrates time needed and resulting file size to 
encrypt the XML message set using our model compared 
against W3C XML encryption model using a key size of 128 
bit encrypting each message in full. 
 
TABLE 7: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR STAGE 1 – EXPERIMENT 1 
Stage 1 – 
Experiment 1 
(Full 
Encryption) 
Processing Time File Size 
XML 
Message Set 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
XML 
Messages  
SXMS 
Model 
1 XML File 0.0018 MS 0.0023 MS 1 XML File 0.0018 MS 
300 XML  0.562 MS 0.702 MS 300 XML  0.562 MS 
600 XML  0.873 MS 1.264 Sec 600 XML  0.873 MS 
900 XML  1.271 Sec 1.825 Sec 900 XML  1.271 Sec 
1,000 XML 
(Set 1) 1.625 Sec 2.456 Sec 
1,000 XML 
(Set 1) 1.625 Sec 
 
We have encrypted the XML messages in chunks of 1, 300, 
600, 900, and 1,000 messages. Our SXMS model processed 
the XML chunks with a measurable improvement in 
processing time compared to W3C XML encryption model 
which uses a 128-bit key size to encrypt the whole XML 
message. SXMS uses a 128-bit key in the cases where the 
importance level attribute value equals to “Medium” and 256-
bit key used when the importance level attribute value equals 
to “High”. As seen in table 7, the encryption process for the 
whole XML 1,000 messages using W3C Encryption standard 
with a 128-bit key size took 2.456 seconds to complete, 
compared to 1.625 seconds using SXMS model. The result 
reflects a 33.8% improvement in processing time for the 1,000 
messages. Figure 11 illustrates the comparison between the 
two models and performance improvement using SXMS.  
Table 7 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML 
messages using SXMS model, table shows a measurable 
reduction in file size, whereby the total size of the encrypted 
1,000 XML messages was 988 KB using W3C model with a 
key size of 128-bit encrypting each XML message in full. 
SXMS achieved smaller sizes for the same set of 1,000 
encrypted XML messages which is 652.4 KB showing a size 
reduction of 34% from the encrypted file size using W3C 
model. Such improvement can save a measurable amount of 
space and bandwidth on large scale. Figure 11 illustrates the 
processing time needed to encrypt the sample messages in the 
first experiment compared to our model. 
 
Figure 11 Comparison chart between SXMS and W3C model using 128-bit  
 
As seen in Figure 11, the x-axis present the number of XML 
messages being processed, while y-axis present the processing 
time encrypting XML messages in seconds. Figure 12 presents 
file size comparison for the encrypted XML messages using 
SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and processing 
model using a key size of 128-bit performing full message 
encryption. 
 
Figure 12 File size comparisons between SXMS and W3C model using 128bit  
 
Second experiment has been conducted performing full 
encryption using W3C XML encryption standard with a 256-
bit key deployed on the same 1,000 sample XML messages. 
SXMS uses the same sample of XML messages to deploy 
element-wise encryption. Later we compared results for both 
experiments against results from our model. Table 4 illustrates 
time needed and resulting file size to encrypt the XML 
message set using our model compared against W3C XML 
encryption model using a key size of 256 bit encrypting each 
message in full. 
We have encrypted the XML messages in chunks of 1, 300, 
600, 900, and 1,000 messages. Our SXMS model processed 
the XML chunks with a measurable improvement in 
processing time compared to W3C XML encryption model 
which uses a 256-bit key size to encrypt the whole XML 
message. SXMS uses a 128-bit key in the cases where the 
importance level attribute value equals to “Medium” and 256-
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bit key used when the importance level attribute value equals 
to “High”. 
TABLE 8: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR STAGE 1 – EXPERIMENT 2 
Stage 1  
Experiment 2 
 (Full 
Encryption) 
Processing Time File Size 
Message Set SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
256 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
256 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 MS 0.0027 MS 1.14 KB 1.98 KB 
300 XML  0.562 MS 0.811 MS 167.9 KB 283.4 KB 
600 XML  0.873 MS 1.591 Sec 342.6 KB 601 KB 
900 XML  1.271 Sec 2.137 Sec 501.9 KB 864.8 KB 
1,000 XML  1.625 Sec 2.8 Sec 652.4 KB 1112 KB 
In the second experiment of stage 1, we deployed W3C 
Encryption standard to fully encrypt the same sample of 1,000 
XML messages but this time using 256-bit key size. SXMS 
uses the same sample of XML messages to deploy element-
wise encryption. SXMS model uses symmetric AES 
encryption with mixed key values (128-bit, 256-bit), Key size 
used in the encryption process depends on the importance 
level attribute value assigned by the fuzzification stage for 
selected set of tags within each XML message. Table 6.4 
represents the time needed for each model performing the 
encryption process on selected sample of messages. 
As seen in Table 8, the encryption process for the whole 
message using the W3C Encryption standard with a 256-bit 
key size took 2.8 seconds to complete, compared to 1.625 
seconds using SXMS model. The result reflects a 41.9% 
improvement in processing time for the 1,000 messages.  
Table 8 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML 
messages using SXMS model, table shows a measurable 
reduction in file size, whereby the total size of the encrypted 
1,000 XML messages was 1112 KB using W3C model with a 
key size of 256-bit encrypting each XML message in full. 
SXMS achieved smaller sizes for the same set of 1,000 
encrypted XML messages which is 652.4 KB showing a size 
reduction of 41.3% from the encrypted file size using W3C 
model. Such improvement can save a measurable amount of 
space and bandwidth on large scale. Figure 13 illustrates the 
performance comparison between SXMS model and W3C 
encryption standard using key size of 256-bit. Figure 14 
presents file size comparison for the encrypted XML messages 
using SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and 
processing model using a key size of 256-bit. 
 
Figure 13 Comparisons chart between SXMS and W3C model using 256-bit 
 
 
Figure 14 File size comparisons between SXMS and W3C using 256-bit key 
 
Finally, figures 15, 16 illustrates the final performance and file 
size reduction comparison between SXMS and W3C model for 
both experiments which uses 128-bit key and 256-bit key 
performing full encrypting for each XML message in the first 
message set. Figure presents a measurable amount of 
performance improvement using SXMS model. 
 
Figure 15 Performance comparisons between SXMS and XML using 256-bit  
 
 
Figure 16 File Size comparisons between SXMS and XML using 256-bit key 
 
Stage2: Evaluation for this stage has been conducted by 
performing two experiments; first experiment deployed 
performing partial encryption on a pre-defined list of tags 
using W3C XML encryption standard with a 128-bit key size 
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deployed on the second set of 1,500 sample XML messages. 
SXMS uses the same sample of XML messages to deploy 
element-wise encryption. SXMS model uses symmetric AES 
encryption with mixed key values (128-bit, 256-bit), Key size 
used in the encryption process depends on the importance 
level attribute value assigned by the fuzzification stage for 
selected set of tags within each XML message. Second 
experiment has been conducted performing partial encryption 
on a pre-defined list of tags using W3C XML encryption 
standard with a 256-bit key deployed on the same 1,500 
sample XML messages. SXMS uses the same sample of XML 
messages to deploy element-wise encryption. Later we 
compared results for both experiments against results from our 
model. Table 9 represents the number of occurrences for 
transactions marked with “High” and “Medium” across the 
three layers. 
TABLE 9: APPEARANCES FOR EACH CLASSIFICATION LAYER 
 
Classification Layer 
“High”  
Appearances 
“Medium”  
Appearances 
Percentage 
(High + 
Medium) 
Layer1 (Account) 274 43 28.8% 
Layer 2 (Details) 425 484 82.6% 
Layer 3 (Environment) 299 457 68.7% 
 
Table 10 illustrates time needed and resulting file size to 
encrypt the XML message set using our model compared 
against W3C XML encryption model using a key size of 128 
bit encrypting each message in full. 
 
TABLE 10: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR STAGE 2 – EXPERIMENT 1 
Stage 2 Exp 
1 (Partial 
Encryption) 
Processing Time File Size 
Message Set SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 MS 0.0019 MS 1.14 KB 1.61 KB 
300 XML  0.562 MS 0.578 MS 167.9 KB 244 KB 
600 XML  0.873 MS 0.984 Sec 342.6 KB 510.2 KB 
900 XML  1.271 Sec 1.422 Sec 501.9 KB 740.7 KB 
1,500 XML  1.963 Sec 2.218 Sec 810.1 KB 1203.6 KB 
 
As seen in Table 10, the encryption process for part of the 
message using the W3C Encryption standard with a 128-bit 
key size took 2.218 seconds to complete, compared to 1.963 
seconds using SXMS model. The result reflects a 11.4% 
improvement in processing time for the 1,500 messages.  
Table 10 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting 
XML messages using SXMS model, table shows a measurable 
reduction in file size, whereby the total size of the encrypted 
1,500 XML messages was 1203.6 KB using W3C model with 
a key size of 128-bit encrypting each XML message partially. 
SXMS achieved smaller sizes for the same set of 1,500 
encrypted XML messages which is 810.1 KB showing a size 
reduction of 32.6% from the encrypted file size using W3C 
model. Such improvement can save a measurable amount of 
space and bandwidth on large scale.  
Figure 17 illustrates the comparison between SXMS model 
and W3C encryption standard using key size of 128-bit. 
 
Figure 17 Performance comparisons between SXMS and W3C Standard 
using AES-as128 Key 
 
Figure 18 presents file size comparison for the encrypted XML 
messages using SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and 
processing model using a key size of 128-bit performing 
partial message encryption. 
 
Figure 18 File size comparisons between SXMS and W3C Standard using 
AES-128 Key 
In the second experiment of stage 2, we deployed W3C 
Encryption standard to partially encrypt the XML messages to 
same sample of 1,500 XML messages but this time using 256-
bit key size. SXMS uses the same sample of XML messages to 
deploy element-wise encryption. SXMS model uses symmetric 
AES encryption with mixed key values (128-bit, 256-bit), Key 
size used in the encryption process depends on the importance 
level attribute value assigned by the fuzzification stage for 
selected set of tags within each XML message. Table 11 
represents the time needed for each model performing the 
encryption process on selected sample of messages. 
 
TABLE 11: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR STAGE 2 – EXPERIMENT 2 
Stage 2 Exp 
2 (Partial 
Encryption) 
Processing Time File Size 
Message Set SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 MS 0.0021 MS 1.14 KB 1.72 KB 
300 XML  0.562 MS 0.687 MS 167.9 KB 269 KB 
600 XML  0.873 MS 1.42 Sec 342.6 KB 588.4 KB 
900 XML  1.271 Sec 2.026 Sec 501.9 KB 813.9 KB 
1,500 XML  1.963 Sec 2.899 Sec 810.1 KB 1399.6 KB 
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As seen in Table 11, the encryption process for part of the 
message using the W3C Encryption standard with a 256-bit 
key size took 2.899 seconds to complete, compared to 1.963 
seconds using SXMS model. The result reflects a 32.2% 
improvement in processing time for the 1,500 messages. Table 
11 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML 
messages using SXMS model, table shows a measurable 
reduction in file size, whereby the total size of the encrypted 
1,500 XML messages was 1399.6 KB using W3C model with 
a key size of 256-bit encrypting parts of the XML message. 
SXMS achieved smaller sizes for the same set of 1,500 
encrypted XML messages which is 810.1 KB showing a size 
reduction of 42.1% from the encrypted file size using W3C 
model. Such improvement can save a measurable amount of 
space and bandwidth on large scale.  
Figure 19 illustrates the comparison between SXMS model 
and W3C encryption standard using key size of 256-bit 
encrypting parts of the XML message for the second sample 
set. 
 
Figure 19 comparisons between SXMS and W3C Standard using AES-256  
 
Figure 20 presents file size comparison for the encrypted XML 
messages using SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and 
processing model using a key size of 256-bit performing 
partial message encryption. 
 
Figure 20 File size comparisons between SXMS and W3C model using 256bit 
 
Finally, Figure 21, and Figure 22 illustrate performance 
improvements and file size reduction comparison between 
SXMS model and W3C model for both experiments in stage 2 
showing a measurable amount of performance improvement 
and size reduction on a large scale using SXMS model. 
 
 
Figure 20 comparisons between SXMS and W3C Standard using different 
keys  
 
 
Figure 21 file size comparisons between SXMS and W3C Standard using 
different keys 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a novel approach for securing financial XML 
messages using intelligent mining fuzzy classification 
techniques has been proposed. 
Mining fuzzy classification techniques have been used to 
evaluate and measure the data sensitivity level within each 
XML message to find a degree of sensitivity for each tag in the 
message. The mining fuzzy classification process allowed us to 
assign a value to a new attribute added to the parent XML 
nodes. A value is determined by applying a set of classification 
processes based on Mamdani inference. A new value has been 
used to determine which type of encryption algorithm is being 
performed on selected tags, allowing us to secure only the 
needed parts within each message rather than encrypting the 
whole message. XML encryption is based on W3C XML 
recommendation. Nodes that are assigned an importance level 
value of "High" will be encrypted using the AES encryption 
algorithm with a key size of 256 bit to ensure maximum 
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security is performed. Nodes that are assigned an importance 
level value of "Medium" will be encrypted using the AES 
encryption algorithm with a key size of 128 bit. An 
implementation was performed on a real-life environment 
using online banking systems to demonstrate its flexibility, 
feasibility, and functionality. Our experimental results of the 
new model verified tangible enhancements in encryption 
efficiency, processing time reduction, and financial XML 
message utilization. 
Each unit in our SXMS model acts independently as a 
separate system. Taking into consideration such flexible nature 
allows and motivates future work and enhancements. The 
following points describe the future work on each unit within 
our SXMS model: 
• Fuzzy classification phase: We can utilize supervised 
machine learning techniques to automate the fuzzy rule 
generation process, in order to reduce the human expert 
knowledge intervention and increase performance of the 
phishing detection system. This can be achieved by generating 
classification rules using well known classifiers, for example 
we can use: PRISM [25], C4.5 Decision Tree [26], Ripper 
[27], k-nearest neighbor classification (kNN) [28], naïve bayes 
classification [29], linear least squares fit mapping [30], and 
the vector space method [31]. These mining association 
classification rules can be combined with fuzzy logic inference 
engine to provide efficient and competent techniques for 
importance level extraction. 
• Encryption phase: We can utilize a different encryption 
scheme, asymmetric algorithms can be deployed. We have 
deployed symmetric encryption due to the efficiency and 
processing time outperforming asymmetric encryption 
algorithms. Even we can change the symmetric encryption 
algorithm to something different like DES, triple DES, and 
Blowfish. Researchers will be able to test and measure 
performance for any replaced encryption algorithm. Also 
usage of the encryption keys can be change to reflect different 
key size for each importance level assigned. For example we 
can assign an encryption key of size 192 bit instead of 256 bit 
for the importance level “High” value. 
• We can create multiple instances of SXMS whereby it 
handles XML messages based on load balancer designed to 
distribute XML messages on multiple SXMS instances. By 
performing this distribution it will boost the processing speed 
2x or even more depending on the new instances created and 
used. However, such initiative might be high cost on resources 
used. 
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